Fordham University
Masthead Logo

DigitalResearch@Fordham

Articles and Chapters in Academic Book
Collections

Philosophy

1-2007

"HEIDEGGER’S WILL TO POWER," Journal of
the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 38, No.
1 (January 2007): 37-60
Babette Babich
Fordham University, babich@fordham.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://fordham.bepress.com/phil_babich
Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons
Recommended Citation
Babich, Babette, ""HEIDEGGER’S WILL TO POWER," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 38, No. 1 ( January
2007): 37-60" (2007). Articles and Chapters in Academic Book Collections. 29.
https://fordham.bepress.com/phil_babich/29

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at DigitalResearch@Fordham. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles
and Chapters in Academic Book Collections by an authorized administrator of DigitalResearch@Fordham. For more information, please contact
considine@fordham.edu.

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 38, No. 1, January 2007

HEIDEGGER’S WILL TO POWER
BABETTE BABICH
Not so long ago, everyone was engaged in the search for psychoanalytic foundations of poetry,
jetzt trieft alles von Volkstum und Blut und Boden, but it’s still all the same.
Heidegger, GA 39, 254

Heidegger’s Beiträge and Nietzsche’s Will to Power
Nietzsche’s importance for Heidegger is not in doubt as Heidegger engages
Nietzsche, directly or indirectly, throughout his writings, both early and late.
But without a discussion of the complexities of Heidegger’s reading of the
same Nietzsche Heidegger intriguingly associates with the question of modern
science/technology as the nihilating essence of nothing other than
Machenschaft, the function and meaning of the Beiträge in Heidegger’s
thinking will inevitably elude us.1 And the relevant conjunctions go further
than a simple connection. Without emphasising the scientific significance of
the question of truth (and modern technology), without attending to the
differentiation to be made between the resonant conceptual associations of the
German word Wissenschaft and those of the English (and French) science,
indeed, without considering Heidegger’s contributions to the broadest sense of
the philosophy of science as such, one can only misunderstand Heidegger’s
reflections on science and one further runs the risk of mistaking or even
denying the continuity of Heidegger’s thought.2 This same attention to
continuity or a complex whole is also evident in the new turn to Heidegger’s
rhetoric,3 crucial just because it opposes the tendency to read one readerly
construct known as the “early Heidegger” and another and similarly readerly
con-struction called the “later Heidegger.”4
Yet adding the influence of Nietzsche in Heidegger’s thinking seems
merely to compound the challenge for many readers, especially after Lukács,
but also after the repeated forays of Richard Wolin and Tom Rockmore into the
political forests of (more or less) foregone conclusions contra Heidegger. For
Nietzsche’s name continues to serve as an almost automatic signifier of
irrationalism5 when it is not connected, as it continues to be, with Nazism.
Hence Otto Pöggeler contends that Heidegger’s excess regard for Nietzsche6
was at the root not only of Heidegger’s brush with fascism but also his lack of
understanding of the poets he is most famously associated with.7 On these
terms, it has been argued that Heidegger’s irrationalism is revealed in his
apparent antipathy to modern science and technology, which same antipathy
(the argument here is conclusive because it is circular) had already rendered
his thinking initially and lastingly amenable to an association with Nazism but
also with fascism in general.8
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I argue that Heidegger deliberately composed the Beiträge zur Philosophie
in order to keep it as an unpublished work throughout his life.9 Attesting to this
reading, Heidegger’s epigraph to the Beiträge articulates this withholding
gesture: “Here is tellingly held fast [festgehalten] that which was withheld
[Verhaltene] in prolonged restraint.” Such a proclaimed “retention” of the text
was rather less than absolute as Heidegger quite overtly directed a variety of
scholars to the Beiträge over the years, including Otto Pöggeler, among others.
Indeed, by way of Pöggeler’s 1959 essay “Ereignis,” addressed to the subtitled
theme of the Beiträge, Heidegger could seem to have arranged an advance
interpretation of his second “master”-work.10 Patently too, Pöggeler’s Martin
Heidegger’s Path of Thinking (first published in 1963), makes explicit
substantive reference to the Beiträge,11 contradicting Pöggeler’s assertion in
1991 (in the same locus that he names the Beiträge Heidegger’s “second major
work”),12 that “Heidegger never mentioned this work, even to his closest
students.”13
As I read it, Heidegger composed his Beiträge on the model of the
publishing phenomenon that could be called Nietzsche’s “Contributions to
Philosophy,” had Nietzsche only written his own Will to Power, as, of course,
he did not. There are other patterns,14 but it is not irrelevant that the material
that became Nietzsche’s The Will to Power derives from the very Nachlaß, or
unpublished remains, Heidegger celebrates in his lecture courses as the heart
of Nietzsche’s philosophy, and which same non-book, The Will to Power,
Heidegger, in his Introduction to Metaphysics, identifies as Nietzsche’s
“planned major work [Hauptwerk].”15
Thus Heidegger’s first lecture course on Nietzsche, presented during the
period of the Beiträge’s composition (in the series of the same courses
Heidegger notoriously and, for many readers, implausibly, describes as
instantiating his resistance to National Socialism), includes an importantly
parallel reflection on the elusive notion of Ereignis. Ereignis is famously
difficult to translate in a Heideggerian context and there are several options:
appropriation, occasion, eventuality, William J. Richardson’s e-vent, or else
emergence, the word John Bailiff uses to translate Pöggeler’s Ereignis, which
same translation echoes in the more metonymically ambivalent emergency, as
we can find it in Elden and Polt, among others.16 In the Nietzsche lectures,
Heidegger sets Ereignis equivalent to “nihilism,”17 which nihilism Heidegger
polemically affirms as the focus of Nietzsche’s thought as such.18
As it engages the issues of power [Macht] and domination [Machenschaft]
in an explicit and politicized fashion, the Beiträge may also, in just this
explicit sense, be taken as Heidegger’s Will to Power.19 Thus Heidegger
engages the concept of political power in global or indeed geo-graphic terms.20
It is Machenschaft that for Heidegger exemplifies the character of modernity,
which character, so Heidegger maintained, following Nietzsche’s
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historicising, was a framework already cast and determined in the nineteenth
century. (See B § 102) As Heidegger would later identify this modernity in his
lectures to the Club of Bremen, Machenschaft represents the
objective/objectifying world view of modern techno-scientific culture.
Throughout its differing political manifestations, the essence of Machenschaft
was, for Heidegger, expressed by way of a practical and all-too-political and
politicized commitment to all the devices – technical and cybernetic,
biological and psychological – of modern science and its totalizing
development. As such, Machenschaft crosses political borders, as a global
essence of the kind that for Heidegger dissolved the supposed differences
between Bolshevism (this is Russia) and Capitalism (this is instructively, for
Heidegger, not the UK, not France, but the US) as well as the reigning rule of
National Socialism (this is Germany in its absorption with European
conquest). It goes without saying that such inflammatory comparisons and
assimilations continue to plague political analyses of Heidegger.
From Heidegger as Editor to the Published Edition of Heidegger’s Beiträge
I have made the case that Heidegger was consciously (or unconsciously)
inspired (as almost any reader of Nietzsche’s texts can be seduced into
seeking) to appropriate Nietzsche’s style. Yet to raise the question of
Heidegger’s encounter with Nietzsche’s thinking in terms both of its substance
and its explicit stylization is to raise the more complicated question of style as
such in Heidegger’s own work. Most philosophical studies of Heidegger avoid
the question of style in Heidegger’s writings, apart from a generalized
presumption of obscurity as either damning – we may name this, roughly
following Robert Bernasconi, the “Gilbert Ryle response,” which Rylean
response Simon Blackburn has recently exhumed for his own part 21 – or else
as precisely liberating, presenting seemingly inexhaustible material for a
robust industry of explication and/or rehabilitation (rescuing the “good bits,”
and so engendering a politically corrected Heidegger or even a Heidegger, like
a Nietzsche, up to analytic snuff).
In 1935, Heidegger was named to the board of directors for the National
Socialist edition of Nietzsche’s collected works.22 This experience brought
Heidegger into contact with the editorial forces that control an author’s legacy,
even an author of Nietzsche’s formidable stylistic powers. And as is typical
enough, the parallel Heidegger drew was a personal one. In response,
Heidegger composed what might stand as his own “Nachlaß” material. The
Beiträge would then work to limit Heidegger’s vulnerability to editorial
manipulation inasmuch as it could be claimed as Heidegger’s authoritative
legacy.
If I am right that Heidegger intended the Beiträge as part of his edition “aus
letzter Hand,” that is, as last set forth by the author himself, it is ironic indeed
39

that it has not been published as such. For if, as we do know, Heidegger
himself first composed and arranged and then left the order of his manuscript
(and corresponding typescript) unaltered from 1939 until his death in 1976, we
have today nothing less substantially significant than a radical reordering of
the order or arrangement of the divisions of the Beiträge as it has in the interim
been published in both German and English editions.
Shifted from its original position as the section following the prelude, Seyn,
now makes up the eighth section as the final division of the text. The shift
radically changes the disposition of the work. Rather than having the text end,
as suggested in Heidegger’s prospectus, with the Last God (B §§ 1, 23, 34, 39,
42, 43), which section is, in turn, now displaced from its ultimate position to
a penultimate locus, the Beiträge now definitively concludes, this is the beauty
of a publishing decision, with Seyn. Such an ending accords with certain
interpretive expositions of Heidegger’s thinking, confirming a break between
the Heidegger of Being and Time and the so-called “later Heidegger” (I and II)
rather than highlighting the prime problem of the readerly reception of Being
and Time for Heidegger (which engagement may be read as the substance of
Seyn, and here, too, Heidegger could well identify with Nietzsche, and the
liabilities of this first book for readers inclined to what Heidegger throughout
his life regarded as “journalistic” misrepresentations).23
Apart from my own discussion, the radicality of the textual disposition of
the Beiträge from its original form to its published rearrangement has not been
the subject of commentary.24 We recall here that the Beiträge’s editor, Friedrich
Wilhelm von Herrmann was able to justify his ordering of the published text
as he cited a note slipped into the typescript, dated 8 May 1939: “‘Seyn’ as Part
II is not correctly arranged; as an attempt to grasp the whole once again, it
does not belong at this juncture.”25 Von Herrmann took this note to justify
shifting “‘Seyn’ as Part II” to the end of the manuscript, manifestly on the
assumption that the phrase, “as an attempt to grasp the whole once again”
necessitated placing Seyn as epilogue.26
How should one read or interpret the slip of paper in question where
Heidegger not infrequently calls attention to the order of exposition
appropriate, or, contra the reader’s suppositions (and indeed to the optimum
order of approach to particular authors: Aristotle before Nietzsche, to take a
particularly non-random example) or else his remarks in his lecture courses
where such asides also correspond to the didactic disposition of the course? It
is anything but uncommon in Heidegger’s case to find him drawing attention
to an apparent ordering dissonance in his published texts27 and, as I have
elsewhere explored Heidegger’s “musical” style of writing,28 he also offered
both anticipatory and retrospective reviews – in good scholastic style –
throughout his texts and not merely at the conclusion of the same. Indeed
Heidegger’s addenda [for Heidegger often added to his text (he belonged to a
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writerly generation that added insertions to a completed text, a generational
habit that has vanished with word-processing and its volatilization of the very
idea of such “original” conceptual outlines or schemas and plans)] in the form
of such subsequently inserted parentheses (indeed of more than one kind: both
round and square) have been the subject of no little dispute in the case of the
Introduction to Metaphysics [when exactly did he add them? were some of
these “mental” parentheses (or reservations) already present to him at the time
of composition? did he compose all of them later? some of them? why were
they added?]. Given such questions and given the length of time between 1939
and 1976 and considered together with his ongoing editorial engagement with
his own collected works, I have found it at least plausible to suppose, that if
Heidegger had in fact meant to introduce such a displacement of his second
section to the end, he could have done so (and the thematic recurrence of
material from the Beiträge throughout his later works makes this more rather
than less plausible).
Nietzsche as the Last Metaphysician: Science and Technology and the Truth
of Illusion
In the later Zollikon Seminars, referrring to the subtitled theme of the
Beiträge: Vom Ereignis, Heidegger links the misapprehension of these two
themes as he reflects on the failure to understand (the essence of) technology
and Ereignis as a consequence of a decisive “conviction” on the part of the
modern era: “as long one understands being as presence ... one cannot
understand technology and surely not the event of appropriation [Ereignis] at
all.”29 Heidegger links the question of Ereignis to the question of science and
the question of art, which is always, although commentators somehow
manage to be astonished by this connection, nothing other than the question
concerning technology. Thus although von Herrmann rightly attends to the
relevance of the essay on ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ (the ultimate
justification for his editing decision), and although Stuart Elden, for one, also
emphasizes the significance of the conjunction between poiesis/techné in his
reading of both the Beiträge and sections of Heidegger’s lecture courses on
Nietzsche,30 the trick still remains for today’s reader to bring the two together.
What do Heidegger’s reflections on truth in art and truth in technology tell us
in the context of his engagement with Nietzsche?
For in his Nietzsche lecture courses, Heidegger emphasizes that the state of
the question itself, considered as questioning as such and in the wake of or
following the modern technological epoch can best be illuminated in terms of
Nietzsche’s reflective self-assessment of his own first work, The Birth of
Tragedy. As Nietzsche writes in his Attempt at a Self-Criticism, “ the task is to
regard science through the lens [Optik] of the artist, but art in that of life.” (BT
§ii) The question Nietzsche raises here, claiming that he is “the first” to do so,
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is nothing less than “the problem of science itself, science ... as problematic,
as questionable” (Ibid.). For Heidegger, writing in 1936/37, Nietzsche’s
critical provocation of what he named the “problem of science” has been
misunderstood from the start: “Half a century,” he wrote, “has passed in
Europe since these words were written. In these decades, this point has again
and again been misinterpreted and, indeed, especially by those, who sought to
struggle against the increasing rootlessness and devastations of science.” (N1,
218)
Not a matter of missing or overlooking Nietzsche’s passion or his joyful or
‘gay’ science, Heidegger explains that what has been missed or misunderstood
in reading Nietzsche is his insight into the coming to pass of nihilism as such.
This is, of course, the same theme that would become the subject matter of
Heidegger’s 1949 lectures, Einblick in das was ist (GA 79). The called for
‘insight’ into chronic decadence and the sudden devastations of the modern
world, the same insight that requires Nietzsche’s radical questioning after
science, precisely considered as science, is the counter-intuitive call repeated
in What is Called Thinking? (GA 8) This is the call to question the very thing
that we in the modern age of science and technology do not question. As
Nietzsche undertook to doubt more radically than Descartes and to raise the
possibility of critique yet more radically than Kant, Nietzsche’s method
adumbrates the same questioning Heidegger shared with Nietzsche, a project
which also includes Hölderlin’s syncretistic constellations in Heidegger’s
project of redoubled questioning, as Heidegger’s 1942 lecture course on
Hölderlin’s Ister (GA 53) also makes clear.31
Heidegger does not merely install Nietzsche in the pantheon of philosophy
(always already and in itself a not irrelevant achievement): “What Nietzsche
for the very first time and indeed with reference to Platonism, recognized as
nihilism, is in truth, and seen according to the grounding question that is alien
to him, merely the foreground of the far deeper happening of the forgetting of
being, which comes forth more and more directly in the course of finding the
answer to the guiding question [Leitfrage].” (B §55) With respect to this
epochal connection with the eventuality of appropriation, what comes to pass,
that is to say, Ereignis, Heidegger emphasizes that the phrase “God is dead”
routinely associated with nihilism obscures the compass of Nietzsche’s claim.
“‘God is dead’ is no aesthetic principle but the formula for the foundational
experience of the event [Ereignis] in Western history.” (N1, 156, emphasis
added) Thus “Seynsverlassenheit,” as the basic experience of the eventualizing
of Western history is “perhaps the most concealed and denied by way of
Christianity and its secular descendents” (B §55).
Heidegger sets his own articulation of truth as ßh<Qeia in opposition to the
rationalist confidence of the interchangeability of correctness with truth at
every level, especially at the level of the absolute (as patently expressed in
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Hegel and as realistically, positivistically presupposed in the technological
articulation of modern natural science).32 But in a section entitled, Thinking:
The Leading-Thread of the Leading-Question of Western Philosophy
Heidegger emphasizes the inadequacy of this absolutizing ambition in modern
science, reminding us that Nietzsche shows us how little “such a
controversion” as the rationalist project per se “can succeed.” (B §102) On
Heidegger’s reading, Nietzsche’s powerful one-page history of philosophy
traces the transformative history of the idea as (Platonic or purely ideal) truth,
as successively reduced to illusion. Nietzsche is thus the “last and most
passionate thinker to inquire into truth.” (B §239) For Heidegger both
Platonism (which Heidegger duly distinguishes from Plato) and positivism
may be viewed as modes of calculative thought, assuming, be it in a
supersensuous or an empiricist mode, that “knowing is approximation to what
is to be known.” (N1, 151) As Nietzsche understands the progress of truth as
“The History of an Illusion,” the opposition between the apparent and the real
(that is also “ideal truth” and phenomenal reality, which is also to say the
progress of scientific discovery) inevitably “decays into necessary illusion,
into an unavoidable consolidation, entangled in beings themselves [here we
recognize Heidegger’s challenge to the ontic metaphysics of Western technical
rationality], now determined as ‘will to power’” (B §102)
In this sense, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche constitutes both the
culmination of and at the same time the overcoming of Western metaphysics.
Heidegger’s challenge to Western techno-scientific rationality is manifest in
this declaration of the closure and turning point of metaphysics.
Heidegger, Technology, and the Devastation of Style: Nietzsche and
Heidegger
What I have been calling Heidegger’s Will to Power is thus Heidegger’s
appropriation not only of the idea of Nietzsche’s Nachlaß (the very idea),
remaking the Nachlaß as Heidegger reconceived this project as his own legacy,
but also in the wake of the seductive allure of a thinker who could summon the
kind of readership Nietzsche commanded and who could really do the kinds
of things with words that Nietzsche achieved with his writing.
Heidegger succeeded, at least until his death, with his first ambition: that is
to say, he guarded the finished work that would be his Will to Power, as his
writerly legacy. Yet he would be “ruined,” or “destroyed” (kaputtgemacht! to
use his own expression),33 by the effort to engage and to follow Nietzsche’s
style and it is in this same language-stylised sense that I have elsewhere argued
that we might begin to understand his declaration of Nietzsche as his ultimate
undoing.34 This is Nietzsche’s stylized direction of his texts to certain readers
(always an achievement in a published – and therefore, as Nietzsche would
remark, a public and consequently all-too-common [cf. BGE 30] – work). But
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Nietzsche intended his stylistic achievement esoterically. The selective device
in question is as old as Plato. By drawing his readers into the text, writing a
seemingly accessible text and, most importantly, by giving all comers
something to take away from the text as a supposed meaning, Nietzsche was
able to exclude the majority of his readers. As a consequence of this precisely
exoteric accessibility, what (ever) esoteric meaning the text might be said to
have would effectively be ‘protected’ in plain view.
For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s esoteric distinction bears directly on
Heidegger’s own otherwise differently esoteric, but still Nietzsche-inspired,
conception of the nature of questioning as the still awkward elusiveness of his
invocation, “For the few, for the rare” [Für die Wenigen – Für die Seltenen] (B
§5; cf. NI). The appeal of this same stylistic restraint culminates in
Heidegger’s unremittingly problematic expression of silence, which is, to be
sure, a silence that is not (or not only) a matter of speechlessness. “The word
breaks for us ... originarily,” Heidegger writes, “the word fails to come even to
word.” (§13, Reticence and Concern) Reflecting on “Maintaining Silence and
Questioning,” he will claim that an intimate even essential relationship inheres
in both questioning and restrained silence. The point here turns on the one who
has ears to hear, that is, on attuned listening or hearing.
Where Heidegger sets questioning in its guiding modality as authentic or
genuine questioning (as opposed to the kind of questioning that, so Heidegger
emphasizes by contrast in the Beiträge, corresponds to “curiosity” and which,
we can add, likewise corresponds to investigative or techno-scientific
research), Heidegger further details the nature of questioning in the Nietzsche
lectures.35 The style of questioning to be opposed is answer-bound or problemdirected inquiry, the routine or “normal” scientific inquiry that for Heidegger
inevitably stops short of authentic questioning.
Contra received logic, or better said, in opposition to received beliefs or
convictions on logic,36 Heidegger proposes the radical poverty of reflective
thinking. I have elsewhere drawn attention to Heidegger’s emphasis upon the
immediate, that is, the here and the now, the small or the trivial and easily
overlooked, as he invokes this emphasis in his discussions of technology.37
Intriguingly, the minimal achievement that is the modesty of open reflection,
or reticent questioning, turns out to offer us far more than we are used to
regard as thinking, just because we find ourselves brought out beyond the
calculative thinking of our day: “the poverty of reflection is the promise of a
wealth whose treasures glow in the resplendence of that uselessness which can
never be included in any reckoning.”38
The tenor of this proposal – “the poverty of reflection,” “resplendent
uselessness” beyond any calculation (measure, reckoning), continues to strike
many readers as wrong-headed and just and exactly because it seems to
challenge science in its modality as calculating investigation. By contrast,
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although this is not a simple contrast, were this a religious reference for
Heidegger, a reference to the spiritual side of life rather than an explicit
discussion of scientific inquiry, logic, and technology, we would have little
problem with such language and some readers of Heidegger and technology
emphasize a spiritual or meditative dimension for just this reason. To critique
science, to advert to the limits of logic and language or even and only to clarify
the respective roles of philosophy and science without giving the palm to
science, seems plainly anti-scientific and it is relevant to this anxiety that more
than one author has suggested that Heidegger was science-incompetent (an
inaccurate, but tenacious, assertion).39 If today’s philosophy of science is no
longer dominated by scholastic philosophy or neo-Kantianism, as in
Heidegger’s day, it continues to be dominated by the still enduring analytic
approach to conceiving the very scientific problem of science on the terms of
the modern world view (this is what Heidegger means by speaking as he does
of “science as world view,” i.e., contra the idea and ethos of Heidegger’s
thinking of science in the Beiträge and beyond).40
Much of Heidegger’s enthusiasm for Nietzsche’s claim concerning the
victory of scientific method over science itself derives from the philosophical
importance of the qualifying philosophical ability to make distinctions.41 As
Heidegger cites Aristotle’s judgment on judgment in “The End of Philosophy
and the Task of Thinking” as well as throughout the Zollikon Seminars
(following a lifetime of such references): “For not to know of what things we
may demand proof, and of what one may not, argues simply a want of
education.”42 For his part, Heidegger is at pains to emphasize that his
philosophical analysis and “characterization of ‘science’ doesn’t correspond to
hostility to science because such hostility is altogether impossible.” (§76,
Propositions on “Science” §21) As the position of reflection and the object of
such reflection, that is to say, the disposition between philosophy and science,
inevitably excludes any kind of ‘hostility’ as affect: “Philosophy is neither for
nor against science.” (Ibid.)
Heidegger’s critics are famously unmoved by such arguments. And the
reason for this is clear if it is also importantly a matter of affect. Under the
aegis of science which often claims the aura of objectivty, the appropriate
affect continues to be all-important, For this reason, among others, any
criticism of science is automatically taken as a sign of irrationality on the
critic’s part. All Heidegger’s training in logic and mathematics, all his
painstaking references to Aristotle, the first master of scientific logic, together
with his references to the development of that logic into the organon of
precisely modern science in Descartes (and Galileo) and in Kant (and
Leibniz), all of this has and can do nothing to abrogate the charge of
irrationality.43 Heidegger had to expect this objection. What he will later name
the thoughtlessness of modern science in What is Called Thinking? excludes
45

in advance, as he writes in the Beiträge, “every question of the truth of Seyn
(all philosophy) ... as unnecessary, dealt with without distress and removed
from the practical domain.” (B § 73) Fixated in machination, modern science
preemptively excludes philosophy (a preemption that extends to what is
known as the philosophy of science) “insofar as modern science claims to be
one or even the only decisive knowing.” (ibid.)
The Beiträge thus repeats what Heidegger also affirms in his better-known
passage in An Introduction to Metaphysics. Regarded in terms of the
calculative, technological-rational ideal of modernity, regarded as a
triumphalist “logical” ideal, Heidegger claims that both “America” and
“Russia” are effectively, on these very logical or scientific terms, identical or
“the same.” In context (and it is clear that this context would make a great deal
more difference in the debate on Heidegger and Nazism had he published his
Beiträge rather than retaining it as he did), Heidegger reproves or challenges
the then-current regime, that is to say, National Socialism, as he explicitly
names it in the Beitrage, as representing the same dynamic politicizing, the
same technologizing order and ordering momentum as other (and otherwise
different) imperial cultures. In consequence, the impetus Heidegger calls
Machenschaft would be as common to ‘Bolshevik’ Russia as to ‘Capitalist’
America, and such technological machination would also be characteristic of
‘National Socialist’ Germany as well.44 Accordingly, Heidegger argues, “the
‘folk’ [i.e., National Socialist or “German’”] ‘organization’ ‘of’ science moves
on the same track as the ‘American.’” (§76: Propositions on ‘Science’, §10)
We can argue – if it remains a touchy political claim – that this very same
globalizing ideal, i.e., technological machination as such, continues unabated
in the monotonic, more totalized than monopolistic capitalist-cumconsumerist ethos of our own day.
Commentators have attempted, with varying success, to undertake a
hermeneutics of Heidegger’s quasi-Winckelmanian or aesthetic descriptors of
the “inner truth and greatness” of National Socialism.45 Heidegger cannot be
exonerated from the rhetorical excesses of National Socialism particularly
with respect to racism and its mortal consequences. But it might do, at least
for the sake of an all-too neglected issue, to consider the side of racism that is
species-ism. Looking beyond our absorption with ourselves as human beings
in a world of other beings who share life with us, our continued absorption
with humanity (alone and only) might yet reveal itself as a symptom of a
problem we have yet to engage. This is the philosophical problem of life as
such, all life, and hence a problem with immediate consequences (if most
analyses speak of these for our still all-too-calculating sensibilities as bio-costs
or as life- or eco-tradeoffs).
I refer here to a parallel between the Holocaust and animals in Heidegger’s
reference to agriculture as a “mechanized food industry [motorisierte
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Ernährungsindustrie],” when he writes, “Agriculture is now a mechanized
food industry, in essence the same [im Wesen das Selbe] as the fabrication of
corpses in gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the blockade
and the starvation of countries, the same as the fabrication of hydrogen
bombs.”46 The appalling parallel that Heidegger himself draws could not be
better analysed as has already been done by Emmanuel Levinas and by others
who have emphasized that it is not to be countenanced in its sheer and
rhetorical substance. As Levinas expresses it: “This stylistic turn of phrase,
this analogy, progression, are beyond commentary.”47 And while taking
Levinas’s point, we do well to recall that Heidegger’s own substantive context
was originally that of a reflection on the difficulty of a seemingly
straightforward term: Stellen, setting up or disposing, placing, positioning or
framing. Heidegger is here concerned to draw out the transformation of the
word in its use and what that use tells us about the modern world. “A district
of land is set up with respect to the presence of coal, so to say, and the ore in
it.” The disposition in question is for the sake of the resources to be mined as
such. The ordering of Ge-Stell is familiar to us from The Question
Concerning Technology. Thus we follow his argument as he emphasizes that
“By means of such a set up, the land becomes a coal mining district, the
ground becomes a mineral deposit.”48 Thus Heidegger reflects that a manner
of speaking that had meant something altogether different in traditional
agriculture, to “set” a field [die Feldbestellung], has now “gone over into the
same ordering [Be-stellen] that sets up the air for nitrogen, sets up the ground
for the sake of coal and ore, ore for uranium, uranium for atomic energy, this
for destruction on demand.”49
On the terms of Heidegger’s context, that is, with respect to a review of the
original character of agriculture in its traditional sense now transformed into
the new and dominant form of the modern food industry,50 Heidegger’s
comments can do with commentary just to the degree that they are fitting
enough, if still (and on several levels) unsettlingly so. The perspectival context
of the food industry can seem to be a matter of providing for the needs of
human nutrition. This is the viewpoint of food, for us, as we need to be
nourished. Moving, with Heidegger’s “stylistic turn of phrase, analogy,
progression,” from the food industry to the manufacture of corpses, we are
speaking of animals, as such and rendered as so many varieties of meat.
The viewpoint of the animal is defined from the outset as more than other,
more alien to us than any other to ourselves. Thus we are not taking the
viewpoint of the stranger but we are referring to the utter alterity of those who
are precisely all too familiar. These utter other others are the animals (and note
that even here we do not begin to speak of plants, let alone the elements as
Empedocles and a long tradition would speak of these, and as Arne Naess and
others can speak of the earth itself).
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Rilke who invokes the animal’s immersion or insertion in what he names the
Open, plays on the same utter alterity. God creates creation itself – this is die
Kreatur – the animal as creature, but the human is something else again, higher
here than Rilke’s angels. From such a perspective, if we attend to the life-context
and circumstances, that is: what the phenomenologist calls the world of the
animals raised and butchered for food or (and this includes cats and dogs, in
addition to horses, pigs, sheep, cows, and so on) leather, wool, fertilizer, etc., then
we may in the process be able to attend – and I am here seeking to emphasize
how elusive such an attention would be – to the animal’s perspective, as the story
teller Isaac Bashevis Singer has suggested that we might, somehow, begin to do.
In his story, “The Letter Writer,” Singer offers a comparative analogy (one
that is uncannily, awfully, similar to Heidegger’s) to remind us that from the
viewpoint of animals and their suffering, that is, if we begin to consider their
imprisonment, their torture, and their way of execution, as they are butchered
in wretched consciousness (the stunning demanded by law is not just
sometimes but as a rule incomplete, just because, among other reasons having
to do with automation and with speed, the law that requires that the animal not
be conscious as it is slaughtered is factively opposed to the industry demand
to have the animal’s own heart pump out its own life-blood). In concentration
camps that dare not even lay claim to be named as such, that is to say, in the
“meat packing” industry, the animal is without any possible recourse and thus
it is that “all people are Nazis.”51 From this point of view, Singer underlines, in
sadness, “for the animals it is an eternal Treblinka.”
If we almost automatically respond to the story teller’s parallel by refusing
it: dismissing it by pointing out that, after all, animals are only animals and the
proper concern of justice has to do with humanity, we not only overlook our
own animal being but we ineluctably replicate, as Adorno has also observed,
the same fascist logic that dismisses concern for the victims of extermination
by saying that some victims of injustice, say, need not be considered as they
are only [nur] Jews, just as we diminish injustices done to other victims,
saying that, after all, they are only Bosnians, only Rwandan Tutus, only Iraqi
civilians and so on. Thus Adorno emphasized what can seem the
counterintuitive (and thus the successful) logic of oppression as it operates by
way of the emphasis on human valuation (beyond price) in Kant, justifies
distinguishing the transcendent worth or dignity of persons (human beings) by
contrast with (and this is the point here) the “market value of things and
animals,”52 that is to say: all things that, like animals and including slaves or
others esteemed non-human or sub-human, can be said, in distinction to the
human, to have an exactly market price. Thus Adorno declares, paralleling
Singer’s comparison, but also echoing Heidegger’s parallel (as Levinas for his
own part had underscored it in an opposed context), “animals play for the
idealist system virtually the same role as the Jews for fascism.”53
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In the eighth of his Duino Elegies, Rilke writes of what the animal sees as
it looks into “the Open, which is,” he says, “so / deep in animal’s faces.” We
(as Plato captivates us in his story of the cave of our fascinated idealism), look
behind, “our eyes are turned / backward.” We train ourselves not to see “what
is really out there,” but, stand over against objects, things for us, rather than,
for Rilke, facing God. It is not irrelevant to note that even Walter Benjamin’s
“Angel of History” looks backward. By contrast, for Rilke, “Our eyes only are
/ as if reversed.” Rilke repeats the image here of that monstrous Nietzschean
figure of Lyncaeus, who could turn his eyes within, seeing with paradoxicallynamed Lynx-eyes.
Lyncaeus eyes are the eyes of human reflection and self and inward-turning
into the space of subjectivity and to the times that are not all times, but our past
and our future. In reflecting on such a constellation of images and meanings,
as a moral call to action, we do not take the perspective view or glance of the
animal. Indeed and much rather, we systematically avoid it. This is what Rilke
means, if his precisely elegiac voice takes him in his conclusion to give us a
melancholy place, as poetic watchers, as “spectators, always, everywhere,”
who, like distracted godlings, are always set in the pose of one poised to leave.
So “turned toward the world of objects,” which we order in the time of past
and future constituted – built – of our own consciousness, “We arrange it.”
Only to see the decay of the world so made: “It breaks down.” Our response
to this breakdown is immediate and issueless. And as children replace their
toys after a fall, we “re-arrange it,” and “then break down ourselves.”
All I am doing here, as a writer, as an intellectual, as a teacher, is to write,
and writing is not action, no matter what we academics (or critics of the
academy) may say. All the reader is doing here, if the reader has come so far,
is to read. If possibility is higher than actuality, we can remember that more
than thinking stands action in all its possibilities.
The Question Concerning Technology as the Question of Globalization
In the reigning conviction that the current world conflict in the struggle
against terrorism is a struggle against an anti-rationalistic, anti-scientific
world-view, the Manichaean vision of one world (the “free world”) that is promodernity and another world (that would be the terrorist’s world) somehow
contra-modernity continues to dominate. This conviction persists in spite of
the ubiquity of both the resources of technology and of scientific rationality on
all sides in the last century and before (if we, once again, recall Heidegger’s
Nietzschean reminder to us that the nineteenth century sets the tone for today’s
now twenty-first century science [B § 102]). Thus and seemingly to advance a
simplified agenda, many political analysts tend to color any opponent of
Western culture with the Luddite brush of a putatively antirationalism. But, as
Israel’s recent invasion of Lebanon makes plain in the wake of Hezbollah’s
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high-tech resistance to a high-tech invasion and as the recent North Korean test
(or exhibition) of nuclear prowess similarly demonstrates, a perfectly proscience dogma and a matching technological aptitude reigns supreme in our
world, permeating even creationist ideology on the conservative side of
American politics. For it is relevant that what is wanted, even among religious
fundamentalists in the US, is never to abolish science or science instruction
but only to advance as science the doctrines of creationism or, as it is called in
such debates, creation science.
It will do to reflect on Heidegger’s warning to us in his “Question
Concerning Technology,” a warning which has nothing to do with what
Heidegger speaks of as the “danger.” Heidegger’s caution is not concerned
with what technology might wreak or do to us but rather with what we
presume to know about technology, which is also the reason he inquires after
the essence of technology. We are thus warned that we are most in thrall to
technology not when it astonishes us but exactly when we take it for granted,
when we assume that we are control, that is, when it is ubiquitous enough that
we presume upon its anthropological and instrumental character, convinced
that, as he says, “everything depends upon getting technology as an instrument
in hand in the appropriate way. One will, as it said, get technology spiritually
in hand.”54
The rationalist ideal Heidegger named logic well beyond the dominion of
the imaginary sublime is now consummate as the virtual image of modern
technology. This is what Heidegger in the Beiträge analyses as technological
enchantment, it is also Baudrillard’s “virtual” in his ongoing reflections on the
imaginary (first) Gulf War and the second ongoing war in Iraq, broadcast or
publicized or disseminated in the United States in carefully calculated sound
and photo bits – all the news ‘fit to print’ or think to notice on the nightly news.
This is the irreal hyperreal that stands as the certification of the only reality we
acknowledge as Real.55 For both Heidegger and Baudrillard, the modern
scientific world view that rages today ever more unencumbered by any
‘possible’ (imaginable) alternative is the rule that remains. Neither pluralism
nor a ‘return’ to the phantasm of traditional societies can alter the monotonic
play of technique. Neither the modern world nor supposedly pre-modern
societies may be thought or understood as anything other than technological.
There is only modernity, liberal or not, as we choose to claim it, and this is
what Heidegger in the Beiträge names Machenschaft.
From this perspective, as Pöggeler also emphasizes, all reflections
following or in the wake of metaphysics become inescapably “transitional.”56
Modelled on Nietzsche’s seemingly fragmentary form of the aphorism and the
truncated outline, such “contributions” are and can be all that remain of
Heidegger’s legacy – his Will to Power. This is also because, in the keenest
transition from Heidegger I to Heidegger II, paraphrasing Hölderlin’s Death of
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Empedocles and in equally patent reference to Nietzsche, Heidegger begins his
Beiträge with an express allusion, referring as much to the history of
philosophy as to the misapprehensions inspired by his own first book: “The
time for ‘systems’ is over…”(B §1)57 If Hölderlin’s Empedocles, resisting
popular acclamation as king, declares the time of lordship past, we need to
note that the allusion for Hölderlin himself invoked the French Revolution.
How shall we take Heidegger’s ‘“systems”’?58
The problems of today’s modern technology are not merely the problems
of nations and dictators, the problems of politicizing and of war, where our
proximity to political violence, even on the level of the state of the world,
remains safely ‘virtual’ not only because at a distance but also because
publicized only intermittently, so that we, the consumers, can, in the interim,
turn our attention to the distractions of advertised possible lives, perhaps
assuming too, as we often assume, the problem resolved. (We do make such
assumptions: consider the problem of storing nuclear waste, a problem since
the beginning of the atomic age. One might consider it somehow solved,
given all the time that has passed. One would be wrong.) Political problems
today are increasingly enmeshed in conflicts concerning the world. And one
can say that they always were. But these are the resources that are reserved or
needed for specific technologies, not only our technological dependency
(what kind of need is this?) on the same fossil fuels, that Heidegger in
Gelassenheit, a public lecture given in 1955, took to be a need that he in his
own very technologically enchanted innocence assumed destined by nothing
less than atomic power to be rendered nugatory. We need a critical
perspective because the developmental or resource/reserve politics of modern
technology is a biopolitics in a sense that Foucault’s theorists have not
imagined. For such a biopolitics one needs Lacan, Bourdieu, Baudrillard and
Badiou but one also needs Adorno and one still needs Heidegger. This is a
critique of technology, that is also a questioning of technology addressed to
the economic engine that drives the dynamic of the genome project, like the
discovery of DNA in Heidegger’s day (and it is worth saying that Heidegger
was more prescient with regard to the chemistry of life than he was with
respect to gas and oil).59
In our own day, this is the fruit of the high bio-technological powers of
nothing but the exactly motorized, aggregately or corporately industrial,
agriculture industry. It makes every bit of difference to this point that Dolly
was a sheep, cloned for the first time nowhere else but Scotland. The same
promise drives the nanotechnological fantasies of retro-engineering mortality
by cleaning out cellular debris by mechanical means (the computer
programmer’s vision of nano-rotorooters or flushing: household plumbing
remedies at the mitochondrial level) and the seemingly more proximate
promises imagined to await humanity (and investment options) behind a moral
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curtain of religious limitations, there for the taking, as the allure of stem-cell
research.
It is worth paying attention to the metaphorical dreams of modern
technology. Not a representation of Shelley’s Frankenstein, of cobbled
together body parts, joined with Volta’s power of the electricity of nature, not
even Fritz Lang’s robot fantasy that still charms us in television’s androids,
technology’s new illusions have given way to the fantasy of the cyborg. (For
my part, I would hold that there is a difference between the amalgamation of
human and machine as it appears as early as Pythagoras’ golden thigh or
Daedalus’s wings of wax and feathers and a span of flight high enough that the
sun becomes a danger and, by ordinary technological contrast, a man with a
hearing aid: but the we-are-cyborgs enthusiasts disagree with me). This
displacement continues in the flat avatars of gaming spaces and imaginary
discontents (and second lives), between the virtual and the real. Add to this the
disappointingly postdated language of genes and our hope to find ourselves
and not just rice and soybeans and corn named in our essence, what we miss
in cyberspace can perhaps be attained, if not or not yet by way of genetic reor retro-engineering, then by way of a mechanism already functional, via
stem-cell research or failing that, as it may fail, by means of a biotechnology
as yet to be invented.
The point here is not then that humanity itself and not only the ‘natural’
world of so-called ‘natural resources’ may one day come to be taken in the
image of what Heidegger called standing reserve. For this is already (and
already trivially ontic) reality. In terms of marketing potential (and the grand
‘information theory’ of the genome), we may name the entire population of
Iceland. In practical or working functionality (on a more traditional
cytological level), we can refer to fertility clinics as veritable banks of human
beings, potential and actual. So many ova, so many vials of sperm, so many
embryos, not to mention stem cells and cloned cell-lines, the basis of genetic
research not limited to the future, but already cultivated, in some cases for well
more than fifty years. All already stock on hand and nothing at all compared
with the (still-virtual or as yet unactualized) promise of the same technology.
If the genome project has proven to be as anticlimactic as it has, the genetic
code, the sheer molecular idea of a registered and accessible essence of
humanity continues to allure us as a signifier we, perfectly complicit, hope to
take for granted in place of or as a remedy for the lived complexities of human
life and death.
Rilke reminds us that it is exactly death that makes us, all of us, animals.
Unlike the animal, which moves “already in eternity, like a fountain”, we
humans, alone and “only, can see death.” In the contradiction that is the
complement to the metaphysical condition or to the convictions Rilke has the
grace to invoke as the Open, “that pure space into which flowers / endlessly
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open,” there is “that pure / unseparated element which one breathes without
desire and endlessly knows.” This is the truth of our deepest destiny. Dying,
Rilke says, we do not move into the Open. For the poet, we are now one with
the animal, almost and in all the possibility that for Heidegger remains, as we
have already alluded to this, higher than actuality: “nearing death, one doesn’t
see death; but stares / beyond, perhaps with an animal’s vast gaze.”
In a mortal world, “forever turned toward objects,” seeing in them “the
mere reflection of the realm of freedom, / which we have dimmed”, it may be
time (this would be Nietzsche’s “high time”) to think about what we do. Not
what we eat and what world we live in but what we do and have done and what
we stolidly continue to do to that world and to the beings we raise in order to
live off their life, from their suffering, consuming and shod by and dressed in
the products of the same. For we have indeed inherited the earth, we do indeed
have dominion over it, over all the animals that crawl, fly, or swim. And be it
by hunting, poisoning, neutering, genetic modification, or ordinary sacrifice
(which language, as Shiv Visvanathan reminds us with the example of “triage,”
also makes an appearance in the conventions of political ecology and
sustainable development), we have proven ourselves East and West, North and
South to be consummate masters at emptying the world of as many species as
we can, and at break neck speed.
The ecologists have informed us that the dynamic of modern technology
cannot be ‘sustained’. But what upsets us is neither the enormity of our
temerity nor the efficiency of our destruction of species, or our pollution of
land or water, or our veritable alteration of the air, that is to say, the winds, our
climate, the balance of the world’s temperature or times. What upsets us, as it
would upset a small child, is the single thought that the things we do might not
be doable for all time. That it cannot be sustained is what galls us, not what we
do. That is the project of ‘sustainable development’ as a problem to be solved
by science and technology, via legislation and above all as the critics of the
very idea of sustainable development have reminded us from the start,
beginning with Adorno and with Marcuse, Winner, Davison, Shiva,
Visvanathan, and Illich, by way of corporate involvements or profits. Yet the
idea of sustainable development in its purest sense, if we could find a way to
believe in this ideal, that is, even at its optimistic best, in advance of the
automatic cooption of vested interest, apart from capital, suggests only the
very politic conception of limits or restraint, but never change. We seek to
slow, we hope to conserve, and that is exactly because we mean to continue as
we have ever done.
In this way, Heidegger’s question concerning modern technology and
modern science does not inquire into the practical question of instrumental
reason but much, much rather seeks to ask, “what may I hope?” as Kant had
posed this more venturesome question (in Rilke’s sense, as Heidegger draws it
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out for us) after the first two of his critical questions, “what can I know?” and
“what must I do?” And in the book that can be read together with Being and
Time, namely Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger adds a
dissonant parallel, suggesting that Kant had raised a further and fourth
question, “What is the human being?”
Among other things, this fourth question is the reason Heidegger’s Being
and Time is articulated by means of an inquiry into that being that is always
mine to be, that being that remains always ours to be, Da-sein. As Heidegger
expresses this question beyond anthropology (and its coordinate instrumental
articulation), the danger of modern technology is relevant to this fourth
question, as he explores what remains his most dissonant challenge to us
today, spoken as a challenge to Western metaphysics, which is to say, by
raising the question of humanism, as the question of human being, as a
question.
Nietzsche for his part had earlier raised this same question in terms of
nature, a question inviting or daring us to de-humanize our understanding of
nature, a question he argued that would help us re-naturalize humanity. “When
will all these shadows of God cease to darken our minds? When will we
complete our de-deification of nature? When may we begin to ‘naturalize’
humanity in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?” (GS
§ 109) The current debates on ‘naturalism’, as analytic philosophers
understand the notion, so both Heidegger and Nietzsche would remind us,
inevitably fail to raise the grandly and the trivially complex question of nature
just because the conventionality of such debates takes its point of departure
from the very position Nietzsche challenges. These debates (and the language
of the same) assume that we know what the natural is and that we know what
nature is. For Nietzsche, we can only fail to naturalize humanity to the extent
that we deify which is also to say that we reify nature, distancing it from
ourselves whereby we exclude the human (as such) from what we take nature
to be. It is this exclusion that fails, now for Heidegger, to ask the question of
essence, which is, as we know, for Heidegger, a failure of thinking or letting
be: Gelassenheit.
There is today no task more pressing than to raise Heidegger’s question of
humanism precisely as the question of the human, whereby we might begin to
raise the question of animal, plant, that is to say, and withal, natural (and that
always means also supernatural) being, as open questions. Raising the
question of technology (art) and nature, as multifarious aspects of the question
of humanism, might take us in just the spirit of self-overcoming that is for
Heidegger, and for Nietzsche, the meaning of the above-human – the
Übermensch – beyond ourselves.
Fordham & Georgetown Universities
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